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Abstract From January 2015 to December 2017, approximately 1.6 million migrants 
crossed the Mediterranean to reach Europe. The death toll was dramatic, with almost 15,000 
drowning. In response to the void left by the ending of the Italian-led Mare Nostrum mission, 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) launched their own search and rescue 
(SAR) operations, rescuing over 110,000 migrants. In this article, we argue that states have 
the responsibility not only to coordinate, but also to directly provide adequate SAR operations 
in the Mediterranean, and that these responsibilities are presently being abdicated. Although 
much criticism of NGO maritime rescuing operations is misplaced, non-governmental SAR 
has notable limitations, and states are ultimately responsible for this shortfall.
Introduction
Between January 2015 and December 2017, almost 15,000 migrants died trying 
to reach Europe by sea (IOM 2017; UNHCR 2017).1 The humanitarian crisis in 
the Mediterranean deteriorated from November 2014, after the halting of the 
Italian Navy search and rescue (SAR) operation Mare Nostrum. In response, 
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) attempted to fill the gap left 
by the lack of large-scale SAR missions. These include the Migrant Offshore Aid 
Station (MOAS), which launched the first non-governmental rescuing operation off 
the shores of Libya, the Amsterdam, Barcelona, and Brussels sections of Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF), Sea-Watch, SOS-Méditerranée, Sea-Eye, Pro-Activa Open 
Arms, Jugend Rettet, the Lifeboat Project, the Boat Refugee Foundation, Save the 
Children and Mission Lifeline. NGOs have certainly saved lives: without them, 
thousands more migrants would have died. However, non-governmental rescue 
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), 
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the 
original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
 1 Official casualty counts suffer from severe limitations and are likely to be underestimated; see 
Last et al. (2017).
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operations have been criticized for increasing the flow of migration and facilitat-
ing smuggling. These operations also raise the broader question of whether it is 
acceptable for states to rely on NGOs for SAR operations.
This article considers the moral responsibilities that states possess around 
SAR. First, we argue that states have a moral responsibility to ensure that SAR 
operations take place. This responsibility, we will suggest, has been clearly abdi-
cated by states. Second, in so far as the Central Mediterranean migratory route 
is concerned, we argue that states have a responsibility to directly provide SAR, 
owing to the limitations inherent in relying on NGOs such as MOAS and MSF. 
Although some objections to NGO SAR missions are overstated or mistaken, 
non-governmental SAR is still somewhat problematic. Most notably, the conduct 
of SAR by NGOs faces significant limitations in terms of capacity and can be con-
ducive to a further abdication of state responsibility by allowing governments to 
justify their unwillingness to provide adequate rescue services.2 The upshot is that 
states are doubly failing in their responsibilities: both to ensure adequate SAR and 
to provide it themselves.
The article proceeds as follows. We first provide a summary of the humanitarian 
crisis in the Mediterranean, before delineating states’ moral and legal responsibili-
ties to provide SAR. We argue that the international community has a general duty 
to ensure that SAR is provided and consider which states in particular possess this 
duty. We then consider whether the use of NGOs for performing this duty is an 
abdication of the responsibility. We will argue that, in principle, states have a moral 
responsibility to ensure SAR takes place, but not necessarily to always provide it 
themselves. This is what we call the ‘Minimal View’ of SAR responsibilities. The 
next section considers the problems raised by relying on private actors for SAR 
operations off the shore of Libya. In light of these concerns, we conclude that in the 
context of the Central Mediterranean migration crisis, SAR should be directly pro-
vided by states. This is what we call the ‘Maximal View’ of SAR responsibilities.3
Although public and academic debates often lament the absence of adequate 
SAR (see Heller et al. 2016; Tazzioli 2016; Carrera and Den Hartog 2015), they 
often miss the fact that states are morally required to ensure adequate SAR. To 
our knowledge, this is the first academic account that argues states have a moral 
responsibility to ensure SAR and that states have been abdicating this responsibil-
ity. This is also the first article that examines the ethical implications of relying on 
non-governmental providers for SAR operations.
To clarify and evaluate the central normative issues surrounding the conduct 
of large-scale SAR operations, we employ Rawlsian ‘reflective equilibrium’, the 
conventional meta-ethical method of contemporary political philosophy. This 
method works by attempting to achieve coherence between general moral princi-
ples and considered moral convictions in particular issues or cases (Daniels 2016; 
Rawls 1999). Based in the field of applied political philosophy, this article focuses 
on seaborne migrations across the Central Mediterranean as a ‘normative case 
study’ (Thatcher 2006), examining the coherence between SAR operations off-
shore of Libya and general moral principles from international political theory.
 2 Note that we only focus on maritime SAR. There may be similar issues that arise with SAR on 
land, but space precludes considering these in this article.
 3 The Maximal View might also be relevant for other crises in other regions, which face similar 
situations if NGOs are relied upon to provide SAR.
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The empirical analysis of this article relies on three different types of qualita-
tive data. First, we conducted a set of semi-structured, anonymized interviews 
with representatives from all the NGOs working on SAR off Libya, as well as 
with law enforcement personnel working for the Italian Coast Guard, Frontex and 
military personnel from the Italian Navy and the European Union (EU) mission 
EUNAVFOR Med. Second, this research relies on a systematic analysis of public 
communications and official reports by NGOs, the Italian government and EU 
agencies. Third, the article draws on research tools from multi-sited ethnography 
(Marcus 1995), most notably participant observation (DeWalt and DeWalt 2002; 
Rabinow and Sullivan 1987). More specifically, we directly observed three stake-
holder meetings involving representatives from both humanitarian and security 
organizations. Participatory fieldwork conducted by one of the authors aboard 
the Sea-Watch’s vessel SAR operation in August 2017 also informed this research.
Provision of SAR in the Mediterranean
In October 2013, the sinking of two large boats near the island of Lampedusa caused 
the death of over 600 migrants (Tazzioli 2016). Calls for action by the Pope and 
other opinion leaders urged Italian decision-makers to undertake more proactive 
SAR activities. The Italian Navy launched Operation Mare Nostrum in October 
2013, involving the use of 34 warships and approximately 900 sailors per working 
day. The operation cost €11 million per month (Patalano 2015: 17). However, the 
operation was short-lived. By the end of October 2014, discontent amongst Italians 
about the lack of burden sharing within the EU and criticism from other states 
that the mission was a ‘pull factor’ for further migration led to the termination of 
Mare Nostrum and the launching of EU border agency Frontex operation Triton 
(Carrera and Den Hartog 2015). Unlike Mare Nostrum, Triton was primarily a 
border control mission, initially operating within 30 nautical miles of the Italian 
coast with a third of Mare Nostrum’s budget and far fewer smaller number of ves-
sels (Cusumano 2017a; Tazzioli 2016). As the humanitarian emergency intensified 
(Glynn 2016; Mann 2016), the budget of Triton was tripled, and its operational 
area expanded from 30 miles to 138 miles off the Italian coast in April 2015. The 
mission, however, still remained focused primarily on border control (Campbell 
2017; Tazzioli 2016). In the summer of the same year, the EU launched the Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operation EUNAVFOR Med ‘Sophia’. 
In the same period, the Italian Navy also launched operation Mare Sicuro. Both 
of these missions, however, focused on disrupting smuggling networks and pro-
tecting commercial activities rather than the provision of SAR (Cusumano 2017a; 
European External Action Service 2017).
By late 2015, the number of migrants seeking to reach Greece from Turkey 
increased dramatically, leading to the deployment of the Frontex operation Posei-
don in the Aegean sea (Frontex 2017). The number of migrants attempting the 
Mediterranean route fell following the March 2016 agreement between the EU and 
Turkey. The humanitarian emergency, however, continued off the shore of Libya. 
In 2016 alone, 181,436 migrants reached Italian shores. At least 4,500 migrants went 
missing at sea (IOM, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). After July 2017, departures from Libya 
decreased substantially owing to instability in the smuggling hub of Sabaratha and 
to an agreement between the Italian government and Libyan militias. However, 
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as the root causes of large-scale migration remain unaddressed, this lull may be 
short-lived (Kingsley 2017). Moreover, in spite of the reduced number of migrant 
crossings, deaths at sea remain high, amounting to at least 3,000 as of the beginning 
of December 2017 (IOM, 2017; UNHCR, 2017).
In what follows, we argue that the failure to ensure and directly provide ade-
quate SAR by states—and not just Italy—constitutes a serious abdication of their 
responsibilities. But, first, we need to establish that states do indeed possess these 
responsibilities.
States’ responsibility and SAR
This section argues for a general international responsibility to ensure maritime 
rescue. The section uses the broader term ‘ensure SAR’ to denote the guarantee 
that SAR is provided. Since more specific responsibilities exist to (i) coordinate 
and (ii) directly provide SAR, this section also explores which actors bear these 
more specific responsibilities. We first consider the duty to ensure SAR. We argue 
that there are (at least) four potential grounds for this duty. We do not aim to 
defend one in particular here; our aim is simply to show that the duty to ensure 
SAR is a corollary of several leading approaches in political philosophy.
The first potential ground sees SAR as a duty of justice. On the ‘interactional’ (or 
‘non-relational’) approach to cosmopolitan justice, there are duties of justice regard-
less of our current institutional arrangements. This establishes a duty simply based 
Table 1. Non-governmental providers of SAR in the Mediterranean.
NGO Capabilities Period
MOAS 40 m Phoenix August 2014–October 2017
51 m Responder October 2015–November 2016
MSF 50 m Dignity 1 May 2015–November 2016
68 m Bourbon Argos April 2015–November 2016
77 m Prudence March 2017–October 2017
Sea-Watch 27 m Sea-Watch1 April 2015–October 2015
33 m Sea-Watch2 March 2016–October 2017
50 m Sea-Watch3 October 2017–
Sea-Eye 26 m Sea-Eye May 2016–October 2017
LifeBoat Project 23 m Minden June 2016–September 2017
Pro-Activa 30 m Astral June 2016–November 2016
37 m Golfo Azzurro December 2016– 
37 m Open Arms March 2017–
SOS-Méditerranée 77 m Aquarius February 2016–
Jugend Rettet 37 m Iuventa July 2016–August 2017
Boat Refugee Foundation 37 m Golfo Azzurro September–November 2016
Save the Children 57 m Vos Hestia September 2016–November 2017
Mission Lifeline 33 m Sea-Watch2 October 2017–
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on others’ common humanity (Caney 2005a). There can also be an ‘institutional’ 
(or ‘relational’) cosmopolitan defence of SAR. This holds that ‘practice-mediated 
relations in which individuals stand condition the content, scope, and justification 
of those principles’ (Sangiovanni 2007: 5). One can conceive of the duty to ensure 
SAR in terms of positive or negative relational cosmopolitan duties. The former 
(which would be the second ground of the duty) would argue that positive duties 
arise to undertake SAR in virtue of the common, global institutional background 
that establishes the principles of justice (see, for instance, Beitz 1999). But the duties 
to ensure SAR are perhaps clearest through the use of negative duties. The claim 
(and the third ground of the duty) would be that states have negative duties to 
undertake SAR in response to the common, global institutional background that 
violates rights. That is to say, states have a duty to ensure SAR as a way of redressing 
previous violations of the negative duty not to harm those beyond their borders. 
For instance, a state may have a duty to ensure SAR to redress the severe instability 
caused by its unjust colonial policies. Analogously, Thomas Pogge (1992) presents 
an institutional cosmopolitan account of the negative duty argument in the context 
of humanitarian intervention, which runs as follows. Many of us are implicated in 
the upholding of an unjust global economic order that leads to extreme poverty and 
humanitarian crises. This is through policies such as supporting dictators, unequal 
trade tariffs, intellectual property rights, environmental pollution, and an unfair 
system of borrowing and resources privileges that lead to violent conflicts (Pogge 
2008). Consequently, we have violated our negative right not to harm those beyond 
our borders. To redress these violations, Pogge argues that humanitarian interven-
tion (and, more generally, the redistribution of wealth to those who are worse off 
within current international arrangements) is sometimes required. Pogge’s argu-
ment can be extended to the idea of ensuring SAR: like humanitarian intervention, 
SAR is required to redress the rights violations of the unjust global economic order 
that, for instance, lead to migrants traversing the Mediterranean.
This fourth ground is that SAR could be considered a humanitarian duty. This 
duty stems from the fact that fellow humans are in peril, and they could be saved 
relatively easily. This is because the costs of providing SAR operations are not 
prohibitive and can be shared at reasonable cost between members of the inter-
national community.4 Peter Singer’s famous use (1972) of the case of the ‘child 
drowning in the pond’ to justify cosmopolitan duties is particularly apposite here: 
just as there are humanitarian duties to assist a nearby child drowning in a pond, 
so too are there humanitarian duties to assist migrants drowning. Adequate SAR 
is an obvious way of preventing deaths at a reasonable cost for potential res-
cuers. It is worth noting that this potential ground of SAR is perhaps the least 
controversial, given that the existence of a humanitarian duty to rescue is widely 
accepted amongst moral and political philosophers.5 Not only is this a key claim 
of most cosmopolitan accounts (e.g. Caney 2005a), but virtually all mainstream 
scholars in international political philosophy accept that states have positive, 
humanitarian duties beyond their borders, such as a duty to rescue. This includes 
 4 This humanitarian duty can overlap with duties of justice on the interactional/non-relational 
account of justice. The interactional account goes beyond mere humanitarian duties though, claiming 
that we have duties to ensure equality of opportunity.
 5 The duty to rescue is even enshrined in tort law in certain states—individuals can be held legally 
liable for failing to fulfil it (Mann 2016).
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non-cosmopolitans who reject arguments for cosmopolitan justice (Miller 2007; 
Nagel 2005)—and who may therefore question the first three grounds for SAR.6 It 
is also worth noting here that one may accept that states owe some duties to those 
beyond their borders, such as the duty to ensure SAR, while holding that they 
owe greater duties to citizens, and that nationality, self-determination or com-
munal autonomy are valuable for non-instrumental reasons. For instance, non- 
cosmopolitans such as David Miller (2007: 270) and Michael Walzer (2002) endorse 
international duties, most notably to engage in humanitarian intervention, based 
on humanitarian duties. There are, then, several potential grounds for an interna-
tional, general duty to ensure SAR.
Launching effective rescue operations (even outside the state’s own ‘SAR 
zone’) is also sometimes legally required. As specified by the Maritime Safety 
Committee Resolution 167(68)/2003 (para. 6.5) and restated in the 2013 Interna-
tional Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (chapter 3.6.1), the 
first Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) that receives information on 
a distress event outside its own SAR zone is required to coordinate rescue oper-
ations until the authorities responsible for the SAR zone can take over the SAR 
mission (Trevisanut 2010). As the Italian MRCC receives most distress calls in the 
Central Mediterranean and the country responsible for the SAR zone where the 
situation occurs—Libya—has been neither able nor willing to take over rescue 
operations, Italian authorities have been legally in charge of most rescue SAR mis-
sions.7
The following question thus arises: which specific agent is morally responsible 
for providing SAR in the Mediterranean? Put another way, who in the interna-
tional community bears the humanitarian duty to rescue? General moral duties 
of humanitarian assistance are held by all agents (including but not limited to 
individuals and states), but they need to be assigned to a specific actor. It is to this 
we now turn.
Assigning duties related to SAR
Under Article 98 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)—which reinstates the obligations already enshrined by the 1974 Con-
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea and the 1978 SAR Convention—the states where 
the ship is registered (usually referred to as flag states) and coastal states have a 
duty to render assistance to those in distress at sea by coordinating and directly 
providing SAR operations in the areas identified as their own ‘search and rescue 
regions’ (SSR), also referred to as ‘SAR zones’ (Aalberts and Gammeltoft-Hansen 
2014; Trevisanut 2013). In the Mediterranean, however, overlapping SAR zones 
complicate this situation. For instance, Malta and Italy share responsibility for the 
SAR zone off the shore of Southern Sicily. Libya officially accepted the existing 
SAR regime and the obligation it entails only in July 2017, but it has not yet signed 
the SAR Convention and remains unable to independently conduct  effective 
 7 Author’s interviews with Italian Coast Guard Captain working at the Italian Maritime Rescue 
Coordination Centre, April 2016 and January 2017.
 6  The debate between cosmopolitans and statists does not turn on the question of whether 
humanitarian duties exist, but rather focuses on whether duties of global justice exist and, in particular, 
duties to address global inequality.
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operations.8 Greece and Turkey also share the SAR zones crossed by migrants 
travelling the Eastern Mediterranean route in the Aegean Sea (Aalberts and 
Gammeltoft-Hansen 2014).9
Moreover, coastal states often lack the capacity to perform the extensive oper-
ations required to assist the large number of migrant boats traversing the Med-
iterranean. Effective large-scale SAR includes the establishment of an MRCC 
responsible for receiving distress calls, as well as the availability of coast guard 
and naval forces capable of directly conducting rescue operations. As Patalano 
(2015) suggests, no constabulary coast guard alone can provide large-scale rescu-
ing services, which require a capable navy with a permanent offshore presence. 
To date, however, only Italy has deployed its navy to conduct the SAR operation 
Mare Nostrum, which required a considerable amount of assets, personnel and 
financial resources. Although the EU has launched some multinational military 
and law-enforcement maritime operations, such as Triton and EUNAVFOR MED 
‘Sophia’, these missions do not have SAR as part of their mandate (Cusumano 
2018; European External Action Service, 2017; Tazzioli 2016). Malta and North 
African states such as Tunisia and Libya, by contrast, arguably lack the capabilities 
to sustain such large-scale operations. The EU has trained and supplied the Libyan 
Navy and Coast Guard, but this force still ill-equipped for conducting large-scale 
SAR and is presently under investigation by the International Criminal Court for 
its inhumane treatment of migrants (Reuters 2017).10 Accordingly, coastal Member 
States often lack the ability to ensure adequate SAR and, even when they do (e.g. 
in the case of Italy), they often unfairly carry most of the burden.
As documented in the political philosophy literature on the distribution of 
responsibilities (see, for example, Miller 2001), when collectives hold responsibil-
ities that are not clearly assigned to particular agents, as is the case currently with 
SAR, they may not be discharged. Without a clear assignment, agents will often 
disagree about where the responsibility lies and use this ambiguity to justify their 
failure to contribute sufficiently. In David Miller’s words, without a clear assign-
ment ‘there is a danger that the suffering or deprivation will continue unabated, 
even though everyone agrees that it is morally intolerable, because no one is will-
ing to accept the responsibility to step in and relieve it’ (2001: 453). This is what 
Miller calls the problem of ‘remedial responsibility’. In order to ensure remedial 
responsibility, one agent has to be clearly ‘picked out’. As Miller acknowledges, 
however, determining which agent should be picked out and assigned responsi-
bility can be difficult.
There are several potential ways of assigning moral responsibility discussed 
in the literature on the assignment of duties (see, for instance, Miller 2001; Tan 
2006). Scholarship on the distribution of duties surrounding climate change is the 
most advanced (e.g. Caney 2005b; Page 2008). It considers assigning responsibility 
 8 Author’s interview with Italian Coast Guard Captain, December 2017.
 9 Additionally, all seafarers have a legal duty of SAR for ships found in distress in their vicinity, 
which could mean commercial ships that intersect with migrant traffic. The current system, however, 
provides several disincentives to fulfilling this duty. Merchant vessels are often ill-suited to conduct 
rescuing missions, which may entail extra costs and even trigger prosecution for abetting illegal 
immigration (Basaran 2015). As a result, some commercial ships avoid migrant-heavy areas, refusing 
to reveal their positions and bypassing migrant boats in distress (Aarstad 2015: 414–415).
10 Authors’ interview with Italian Coast Guard Captain, December 2017; Authors’ interview with 
human right activist, December 2017.
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to those who are responsible, particularly morally responsible, for climate change 
(the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’), to those who are most able to bear the burdens 
(the ‘Ability to Pay Principle’), and to the beneficiaries of climate change (the ‘Ben-
eficiaries Pay Principle’).
Where does this leave us with regard to the duty to ensure SAR? General, 
provisional moral duties to ensure SAR are held by all agents (including but not 
limited to individuals and states), but they need to be assigned to a specific actor. 
There is no necessary moral reason why the agent legally tasked with ensuring 
adequate SAR should bear a greater burden than all other agents. The burdens of 
SAR provision, such as the cost of operations and hosting asylum seekers, should 
be distributed fairly amongst actors. Though we do not consider here what exactly 
a fair distribution would entail, it would most likely require wealthy, Western 
states to bear most of the costs. Their responsibility is seemingly overdetermined 
on the moral features typically thought of as relevant in the abovementioned lit-
erature on the assignment of responsibility. Akin to the ‘Beneficiary Pays Princi-
ple’, these states are arguably beneficiaries (beyond their just entitlements) of the 
current global socio-economic system that leads to migratory flows driven by 
global inequality, wars, poverty and humanitarian crises. Akin to the ‘Ability to 
Pay Principle’, such countries are also likely to be most able, given their wealth 
and resources. And akin to the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’, they are in part respon-
sible for the current system that leads to large-scale, seaborne migratory flows.11 
This is especially the case for EU Member States, whose asylum and migration 
policies (foremost amongst them the so-called ‘Dublin System’, which allows 
most refugees to apply for asylum only when they have already reached EU soil) 
ultimately force refugees to risk their lives to illegally enter a European country 
before being able to apply for humanitarian visas (Moreno-Lax 2017; Carrera et al. 
2017; Heijder, Rijpma, and Spijkenboer 2016; Trauner 2016; Franzke 2015). Thus, 
other states—often Western states—should share the burden fairly with the state 
ensuring SAR.12 There is no clear reason why Italy, Malta, Greece or another front-
line state should bear the costs of ensuring SAR over other states, such as the UK 
or Germany, or even those beyond Europe.
Even if one still holds that coastal states are required to do more because, for 
instance, the system of SAR zones tries to ensure fair burden-sharing, this does 
not let countries outside the Mediterranean basin off the hook. It is clear that there 
may be remedial responsibilities when the primary responsibility bearers do not 
fulfil their duties. Here, an analogy can be drawn to the responsibility to pro-
tect (R2P) doctrine, which asserts that states have the primary responsibility to 
tackle and prevent mass atrocities within their borders. When states are unable 
or unwilling to do so, their responsibility to protect transfers to the international 
community (e.g. see Bellamy 2015; Pattison 2015). This remedial responsibility to 
protect may require various preventive and reactive measures, both coercive and 
11 For further accounts of the moral factors relevant to the distribution of duties, see Caney (2014), 
Miller (2001), Pattison (2015) and Tan (2006, 2015).
12 Interestingly, this was acknowledged in the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in September 
2016, where participants agreed (at least rhetorically) that the responsibility to provide SAR operations 
extends beyond the coastal states in the Mediterranean (UN General Assembly 2016).
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non-coercive, to help ensure mass atrocities are addressed.13 If those bearing the 
primary responsibility of providing SAR—such as coastal states—are unable or 
unwilling to do so, the responsibility for SAR transfers to the international com-
munity. The current lack of SAR capacity of Libya, Malta and other states, along 
with Italy’s difficulty in covering the SAR areas of other states in additional to its 
own areas, mean that the remedial responsibility to rescue should be invoked. It 
falls on the international community—and particularly rich Western states—to 
assist coastal states and provide new SAR mechanisms.14 At the moment, states 
are clearly abdicating their responsibilities in this regard.
Public and private provision of SAR
We have argued that states are clearly abdicating their responsibilities to provide 
SAR by not fulfilling their primary or remedial responsibilities. We will now turn 
to consider whether they are abdicating their responsibilities in a second man-
ner. As we have already discussed, NGOs are filling the SAR capability gap left 
unattended by states. On the face of it, this might appear to mean that states are 
necessarily violating their responsibilities to provide SAR. However, in this section, 
we will argue that states might, in principle, rely on NGOs (or even other private 
actors) and still meet their responsibilities. To see this, we need to turn to the pub-
lic/private distinction.
Let us first clarify how we define ‘public’ and ‘private’ in the context of SAR 
operations. The public/private distinction is what Norberto Bobbio famously 
called one of the ‘grand dichotomies’ of Western thought (Weintraub 1997: 1). This 
distinction is employed in various ways, such as to denote the restrictions on jus-
tifiable governmental interference with individuals (in liberal political theory), to 
demarcate the objectionable realms of patriarchal domination (in feminism), and 
to distinguish between the market-based and state-based provision of services (in 
economics). For simplicity’s sake, we will take the public to be the collective, and 
to concern a group and, conversely, the private to be the particular, and to concern 
the individual. As Jeff Weintraub (1997: 5) notes, this is one of the main ways to 
use the public/private divide.15
Thus far, we have considered the responsibility for SAR as involving only 
one responsibility. But there are, in fact, several distinct responsibilities within 
it. These include, centrally, (1) the responsibility to ensure and coordinate SAR 
services in the areas for which agents are morally responsible and (2) the respon-
sibility to provide the actual SAR services. Ensuring SAR involves adequate provi-
sion of SAR by private or public actors and effective coordination amongst these 
actors. This coordination essentially coheres with international law requirements 
13 To be clear: we do not claim that SAR falls within R2P, which is focused on mass atrocities crimes. 
By drawing this analogy, we only intend to show that structurally similar moral requirements apply 
to SAR.
14 Although we focus on SAR, there are also related duties to tackling the root causes of migrant 
crossing of the Mediterranean, such as mass atrocities in Syria, extreme global inequality, the situation 
of those in refugee camps in Lebanon and Turkey, and border restrictions, as well as to offer safer 
routes for passage and to offer humanitarian visas.
15 Patricia Owens (2008) argues that this distinction is socially constructed, in the sense that what 
is deemed ‘public’ and ‘private’ is far from natural but is rather dependent on context and often 
influenced by political power. This argument is perhaps most visible in the maritime sector, where the 
notions of public and private have often been blurred (Mabee 2009).
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(most notably, the SAR Convention) to establish an effective MRCC that can coor-
dinate SAR operations. Other states may have remedial responsibilities as part of 
the more general duty to ensure SAR to assist relevant coastal states in their SAR. 
They might, for instance, be required to pay for SAR. Effectively ensuring SAR, 
of course, also entails removing all the hurdles and disincentives against rescuing 
migrants, such as the risk of prosecution for illegal immigration.
We label the ‘Maximal View’ of responsibilities the idea that public agents 
(typically states) are required to both (1) ensure and (2) directly provide SAR. By 
contrast, in the ‘Minimal View’, public agents are required only (1) to ensure suf-
ficient SAR services are provided within their area. Determining what is ‘within 
their area’ involves considering whether states have a responsibility to provide 
SAR themselves, once they have been assigned the responsibility to ensure SAR 
within a particular region (according the model of the distribution of responsibil-
ities outlined above).
Here is the challenge: the Maximal View (which we defend below) runs into 
the problem of explaining why only public bodies should provide SAR if a private 
actor (such as an NGO or a shipping company) could do so better (e.g. cheaper, 
with better equipment, more experienced personnel). In this case, why is the 
Minimal View not preferable? An analogy can be drawn to the view of minimal 
state responsibilities in the literature on private military and security companies 
(PMSCs). This literature makes a key distinction between the authorization of ser-
vices and their supply (Krahmann 2010; Pattison 2014). Some scholars hold that 
the supply of services by PMSCs is not problematic, as long as they are author-
ized by states.16 Similarly, one might argue that states only have to ensure SAR 
operations. If these could be carried out effectively by private actors—not-for-profit 
or for-profit—states would not be abdicating their responsibilities by contracting 
out to them. In certain cases, this might not be morally problematic, in so far as 
these private actors carry out SAR operations comprehensively and effectively. 
For instance, the UK relies heavily on the Royal National Lifeboat Institution to 
carry out SAR. The UK also outsourced the provision of air medical evacuation 
to a for-profit organization, Bristow Helicopters (BBC 2013). When SAR opera-
tions are likely to be sporadic and small-scale, they could be left to private vessels, 
appropriately coordinated by state MRCCs.
In such cases, the Minimal View might be appropriate. In what follows, how-
ever, we will now argue that this is not the case in the Mediterranean. Put another 
way, we will argue that reliance on private providers of SAR in the Mediterranean 
is only instrumentally problematic, in so far as it is not comprehensive enough to be 
fully effective. We do not claim that relying on private actors is inherently wrong. If 
it were possible for states to ensure that private actors provided sufficient SAR, this 
would not necessarily be a problem. But this is not currently the case off the shore 
of Libya. To demonstrate this, we will first explore NGOs’ current rescue activities 
before exploring the problems raised by the reliance on non-governmental SAR in 
the Mediterranean.
16 These arguments are discussed at length in Pattison (2014).
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Rise of non-governmental SAR missions
The first NGO providing SAR in the Mediterranean, MOAS was founded in 2014 
by Christopher and Regina Catrambone, who used their experience in disaster 
management and part of their entrepreneurial fortune to purchase a fishing boat, 
the Phoenix, and equip it with two drones. In autumn 2015, MOAS extended its 
operations into the Aegean Sea by chartering a second vessel, the Responder, which 
was then redeployed off the shore of Libya in 2016 (Cusumano 2017a).17 In 2017, 
financial strain forced MOAS to rely on only the Phoenix and stop leasing drones. 
In October 2017, MOAS interrupted its Mediterranean operations, relocating to 
South Asia.18
Following MOAS, three different MSF operational branches have become 
involved in SAR. MSF Amsterdam initially provided medical assistance aboard 
MOAS’s vessel and later began a partnership with SOS-Méditerranée (Cusumano 
2017a). The section of MSF headquartered in Barcelona and Brussels, by contrast, 
developed independent SAR capabilities, conducting SAR through their vessels, 
the Dignity I and Bourbon Argos, between April 2015 and November 2016, at which 
point operations were suspended. In March 2017, the Brussels and Rome MSF 
restarted operations with a new, larger vessel, the Prudence. Since the beginning 
of 2016, MSF vessels off the coast of Libya have saved a total of 56,000 migrants.19 
In October 2017, in response to growing criticism and attempts by the Italian gov-
ernment to impose restrictions on NGOs’ activities (Cusumano 2017c), both the 
Brussels and the Barcelona MSF branches decided to suspend their SAR operations.
Sea-Watch, a German charity, became active off the shore of Libya starting in 
March 2015. As rescuing and disembarking migrants to a safe place ultimately 
entailed the risk of challenging states, Sea-Watch initially limited its activities 
to rescuing those in immediate danger of drowning and waiting for the Italian 
MRCC to task another vessel with transporting the migrants to shore.20 In Octo-
ber 2017, however, Sea-Watch bought MSF’s Dignity I and started disembarking 
migrants, as requested by Italian authorities (Cusumano 2017a).
As shown in Table 1, several other NGOs started conducting SAR off Libya 
in 2016, including Sea-Eye, Pro-Activa, the LifeBoat Project, Jugend Rettet, 
the Boat Refugee Foundation and Save the Children. Many of them, however, 
have since suspended operations owing to decreased funding and the growing 
risks of being prosecuted for abetting illegal immigration by Italian authorities 
(Cusumano 2017c). As of May 2018, only Sea-Watch, SOS-Méditerranée and Pro-
activa were conducting SAR operations offshore Libya. SOS-Méditerranée, which 
operates in partnership with the Amsterdam branch of MSF, conducts SAR oper-
ations with the Aquarius, a 77 m ship which can operate under all weather condi-
tions, and rescued over 11,000 migrants in 2016 alone.21 Proactiva Open Arms is 
the charity branch of a Spanish lifeguard company that has deployed two ships 
offshore Libya, the Golfo Azzurro and the Open Arms (Cusumano 2017a).
17  Authors’ interviews with MOAS spokespersons, October 2015. August 2016, and November 
2017.
18 Authors’ interview with MOAS spokesperson.
19 Authors’ interviews with MSF spokespersons, April 2016, October 2016 and April 2017.
20 Authors’ interviews with Sea-Watch personnel, March 2016 and August 2016.
21 Data obtained from the Italian Coast Guard.
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Problems of private SAR
This section considers the problematic implications arising from non-governmental 
rescue, which grounds our defence of the Maximal View. Before considering these 
implications argument, however, we will first repudiate two simplistic and often 
erroneous claims made against maritime migrant rescue in general. These are what 
we call (1) the ‘Pull Factor Objection’ and (2) the ‘Facilitation of Smuggling Objec-
tion’. These objections also seemingly apply to the public provision of SAR and are 
similarly erroneous and incorrect in other contexts.
Pull Factor Objection
The ‘Pull Factor Objection’ contends that SAR operations (both private and pub-
lic) will increase the number of individuals attempting to cross the Mediterra-
nean by reducing disincentives to migration. This objection was first made against 
rescue operations conducted by the NGO Cap Anamur in the South China Sea 
(Grahl-Madsen 1986: 195). European states authorities and Frontex also used this 
argument against all SAR operations and the Italian mission Mare Nostrum. The 
UK and Germany, for instance, criticized Mare Nostrum for ‘encouraging more 
migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing’, and for creating ‘a bridge to 
Europe’ (Riddelvolt and Bosilca, 2017: 9). More recently, Frontex (2017: 32) noted 
that ‘SAR missions close to, or within, the 12-mile territorial waters of Libya … 
act as a pull factor … Migrants and refugees … attempt the dangerous crossing 
since they are aware of and rely on humanitarian assistance to reach the EU’. 
Italian opposition politicians have repeatedly referred to NGOs as ‘migrant taxis’ 
(Repubblica 2017).
Stated in its most plausible form, the Pull Factor Objection runs as follows. 
Providing SAR operations incentivizes migrants to make dangerous crossings 
because they will expect to be rescued if in distress. SAR operations will not, how-
ever, prevent all migrants from drowning, given the large SAR area in the Med-
iterranean and the rescuers’ limited capabilities, and inevitably some migrants 
will perish. Underlying this objection is the seemingly legitimate worry of moral 
hazard. If no SAR operations were in place, a higher risk of drowning would deter 
migrants from attempting the crossing, ultimately saving lives.
Three points call into question this objection. First, casualties depend on SAR 
operations not being capable of sufficiently protecting migrants from drowning. If 
rescue operations were able to rescue all migrants at risk of drowning, this would 
not be a plausible objection. The only worry would then be that SAR operations 
render migrant crossings to Europe easier. To put this another way, the Pull Factor 
Objection could also justify improving SAR operations. Indeed, evidence shows 
that proactive SAR operations such as Mare Nostrum can substantially reduce 
death tolls. When Mare Nostrum was operational, and over 157,000 migrants 
were assisted (Patalano 2015).22
Second, the Pull Factor Objection is based on questionable empirical claims 
about migrants’ decision-making. As ‘risk acceptability is mediated by life oppor-
tunities’ (Hernandez-Carretero and Carling 2012: 413), migrants may still con-
sider dangerous sea journeys preferable to staying in war-torn, impoverished 
22 Authors’ interviews with Sea-Watch personnel, March 2016 and August 2016.
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countries, even if SAR assets off Libya are absent, and their chances of dying at 
sea are greatly increased. Moreover, many of those presently being rescued off the 
shore of Libya do not start their journey with the idea of reaching Europe. Rather, 
they are forced to cross the Mediterranean to escape the abuses they face in Libya 
and their home countries and sometimes forced aboard unseaworthy dinghies 
against their will (Crawley et al. 2016; Toaldo 2015).23
Third, as shown by an overview of migratory trends in the Mediterranean, no 
solid evidence of a correlation—let alone a causal mechanism—between proactive 
SAR and an increase in migrants’ crossings exists. The number of migrant transits 
through the Central Mediterranean route is influenced by a complex interplay of 
‘pull’ and, most importantly, ‘push’ factors. SAR operations (or lack thereof) are 
neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the varying magnitude of sea-
borne migrations from Libya (Crawley et al. 2016; Hagen-Zanker and Mallet 2016; 
Heller and Pezzani 2017; Toaldo 2015). The end of the operation Mare Nostrum 
in late 2014 translated into a shortage of SAR assets off the shore of Libya; still, 
migratory flows increased in 2015. In 2016, NGOs’ presence off Libya peaked at 
12 ships. Still, 2017 saw a substantial decrease in seaborne migrations to Italy. This 
decrease started before NGOs’ presence diminished, and scholarship has associ-
ated it with in-land developments, such as instability in the smuggling hub of 
Sabratha and an agreement between the Italian government and Libyan militias, 
which have agreed on discontinuing their collaboration with and direct involve-
ment in human smuggling in exchange for Italian foreign aid (Cusumano 2017c; 
Kingsley 2017).
Facilitation of smuggling objection
It is also sometimes objected that the provision of SAR facilitates smuggling, 
allowing human smugglers to use increasingly unseaworthy boats with more 
people aboard. For instance, according to Frontex, ‘SAR operations in the Central 
Mediterranean unintentionally help criminals achieve their objectives at mini-
mum cost, strengthening their business model by increasing the chances of suc-
cess’ (2017: 32). This is what we will call the ‘Facilitation of Smuggling Objection’. 
(Note that, although this objection applies to both public and private SAR, it is less 
plausible when public rescue missions are conducted, as state-run SAR missions 
conducted by coast guards and navies like Mare Nostrum are likely to include a 
significant law-enforcement and anti-smuggling element.)
It is unclear what exactly is wrong here in the facilitating of smuggling. The 
SAR operations are launched as a response to smuggling. They attempt to address 
the problems caused by this practice. Although SAR operations may facilitate 
more smuggling, this does not motivate the private provision of SAR operations, 
which, as acknowledged by Italian prosecutors, are clearly conducted for human-
itarian reasons (Cusumano 2017c). Although some have accused NGOs of collud-
ing with smugglers, no evidence of contacts between smugglers and NGOs has 
23 As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, if SAR were fully efficient in one year, they might attract 
even more migrants in the next. However, no causal connection has been found between the existence 
SAR operations and the magnitude of migratory flows. Even if such a connection existed, our point 
here is that SAR should be provided fully, year on year. The practical difficulties of doing so would not 
be insurmountable even in the face of a large-scale, potential upsurge.
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yet been found (Heller and Pezzani 2018; Cusumano 2017c; Senato della Repub-
blica 2017a). Italian prosecutors have investigated two NGOs for abetting illegal 
immigration. Personnel from Proactiva Open Arms who were notified of an inves-
tigation in April 2018 were immediately acquitted. Investigations on Jugend Rettet 
are still ongoing at the moment of writing, but evidence of collusion with smug-
glers is very flimsy (Heller and Pezzani 2018), and even the Italian prosecutor 
conducting the investigation conceded that the humanitarian motives underlying 
rescuers’ behaviour are unquestionable (Viviano and Ziniti 2017). In addition, the 
consequences of SAR, in terms of saving lives, appear to outweigh any harm it 
may cause by facilitating smuggling. It follows that these rescue operations are 
not problematic according to deontological (i.e. intentions) or consequentialist 
concerns.
One could also argue that rescuers inadvertently do harm by facilitating smug-
glers’ use of increasingly unseaworthy dinghies that have caused an increased 
number of casualties at sea (Frontex 2017). In that case, SAR would be problematic 
on the ‘doing/allowing’ distinction in deontological moral philosophy. This holds 
that, other things being equal, it is worse to do harm oneself than to allow harm 
by others (see Quinn 1989; Scheffler 2004). However, smugglers’ use of increas-
ingly unseaworthy and overloaded dinghies cannot be clearly attributed solely to 
the presence of SAR missions, but it depends on a complex interplay of factors, 
including European anti-smuggling and border control policies, as well as other 
factors. Even if a causal connection exists between SAR missions and smugglers’ 
behaviour, any harm that rescuers inadvertently do would be subject to the inter-
vening agency of smugglers. This is because, in the causal chain, smugglers are 
responsible for using rickety dinghies that endanger the lives of migrants—not 
rescuers. This means that the smugglers are causally responsible—their agency 
matters. As such, any harm caused by the rescuers in this regard is likely to be 
further down the causal chain and therefore not as problematic on the doing/
allowing distinction.
To date, the reaction of European states to the migration crisis has heavily 
focused on countering the criminal behaviour of smugglers. For instance, opera-
tion EUNAVFOR Med is based on saving lives by fighting smugglers and reduc-
ing the number of Mediterranean crossings (European External Action Service, 
2017). According to this operation’s mission, smugglers are immoral criminals 
who exploit the weak—a narrative repeatedly criticized by migration scholars as 
overly simplistic (Crawley et al. 2016; Mainwaring and Brigden 2016). However, 
even if smugglers are criminals, focusing on combatting smuggling does not neces-
sarily make sense, as doing so might make matters worse by prompting the use of 
riskier routes and strategies. As of November 2017, the EU operation EUNAVFOR 
Med seized or destroyed 506 migrant boats to prevent smugglers from reusing 
them (EEAS 2017).24 According to a UK House of Lords report (2016), along with 
evidence from academia (Cusumano 2018; Heller and Pezzani 2017; Riddelvolt 
and Bosilca, 2017), and NGO representatives,25 EU efforts to disrupt smuggling 
by destroying boats may account for their resort to increasingly rickety and over-
loaded dinghies. Furthermore, eradicating smuggling could significantly harm 
24 Authors’ interview with EUNAVFOR Med Representative, November 2017. See also Carrera 
et al. (2017) and Cusumano (2017a).
25 Author’s interview with MSF and Sea-Watch representative, April 2017. See also Cuttitta (2016).
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migrants by preventing them from leaving their current location. Overall, smug-
gling may in fact enable migrants to escape worse hardship.26 Though smugglers’ 
behaviour is often mendacious and can facilitate further social wrongs, hinder-
ing Libya’s political stabilization (Toaldo 2015: 6), it is currently the only feasible 
means by which hundreds of thousands of migrants escape death, persecution, 
and hardship (Crawley et al. 2016).27 Consequently, as argued by various scholars, 
human smuggling may sometimes be morally permissible (Hidalgo 2016).
Problems with non-governmental SAR
Having rejected two erroneous objections against both public and private SAR 
operations, this section now turns to the problems associated with NGOs con-
ducting rescue operations. It focuses on two central issues: (i) the problem of lim-
ited capacity and (ii) the enabling of further ‘de-responsibilization’ by states. The 
applicability of these concerns in the context of the Central Mediterranean ulti-
mately necessitates a Maximal View of state responsibility for SAR: in order to 
adequately ensure SAR, states need to directly provide it themselves.
Before doing so, however, we wish to make clear that the provision of SAR 
by NGOs is morally praiseworthy. This is because NGOs act out of good inten-
tions, and the overall benefits that come from their provision of SAR outweighs 
the problems outlined below. However, this does not mean that private SAR is not 
problematic (indeed, many of the NGOs currently conducting these operations 
are aware of these issues).
The first issue associated with NGOs provision of SAR is their limited capacity. 
A central problem for their capacity relates to their reliance on donors for funding. 
Private provision can decrease—and, indeed, is decreasing—as donations dry up. 
When this occurs, NGOs may stop or streamline their operations. Fading public 
attention to the migration crisis, the increasing tendency to securitize migrations 
to Europe by depicting migrants as an existential threat (Huysmans 2000), and the 
misplaced but increasingly vocal accusation that NGOs facilitate smuggling, is 
likely to continue. This could and indeed has already weakened the number and 
capabilities of non-governmental rescue vessels. Indeed, both MOAS and MSF 
first gave up on one ship and eventually decided to suspend operations in late 
2017.
It helps to consider here, more broadly, how the role of NGOs should be con-
ceived. In her award-winning account of the political ethics of humanitarian 
NGOs, Jennifer Rubenstein (2015) suggests that, in order to grasp the normative 
issues raised by NGOs, one must see them as ‘sometimes somewhat governmen-
tal’, ‘highly political’ and ‘often second-best’. NGOs are often ‘second-best’ actors 
because they govern less optimally (in terms of effectiveness and consistency with 
democratic, egalitarian, humanitarian, and justice-based norms) than conven-
tional governments and governmental actors. Since they rely on voluntary con-
tributions rather than taxes to fund their activities, NGOs must attract capricious 
26 For a defence of the decriminalization of smuggling, see Gerver (2015).
27  We do not draw a strong distinction here between refugees and economic migrants. This is 
because ‘[t]here is often a complex and overlapping relationship between “forced” and “economic” 
drivers of migration to Europe”’ (Crawley et al. 2016: 8).
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donors who may have different priorities or little understanding of the intended 
beneficiaries (Rubenstein 2015: 76).
In addition to limited funding, NGOs also lack the means to conduct SAR in all 
places where required. Unlike state military and law enforcement organizations, 
NGOs lack the force required to operate effectively in dangerous environments. 
In August 2016, when a Libyan speedboat attacked MSF’s Bourbon Argos, most 
NGOs suspended their operations for over a week (Cusumano 2017b), leaving a 
gap in overall SAR capability. In 2017, too, various instances of violent behaviour 
by smugglers, militias and Libyan authorities hindered NGOs’ ability to conduct 
SAR (Cusumano 2017c).
In such cases, the two objections considered in the previous section become 
more pertinent. If the private provision of SAR weakens (owing to loss of funding 
or the deterioration of security) but migrants are not sufficiently aware of the drop 
in SAR assets, NGOs’ rescue operations may be subject to a form of the Pull Factor 
Objection. Migrants may make crossings that they would not have made if they 
knew about the diminished capabilities of NGOs capable of assisting them. Smug-
glers too may significantly cut operation costs with the expectation that migrants 
will be saved, failing to grasp the inadequacy of private SAR operations. As noted 
by Frontex (2017), since the foundation of Mare Nostrum, smugglers have started 
to put migrants at sea on boats provided with less fuel or even without an engine. 
The worries about facilitating smuggling may therefore apply—but this time not 
be outweighed (as previously)—if private provision fails to save lives owing to 
decreased capacity.
A second, related issue associated with NGO provision of SAR is that it enables 
the further ‘de-responsibilization’ of states. As citizens increasingly see the private 
provision of SAR operations as a central part of maritime rescue SAR capabilities 
(even while these operations are decreasing), governments may fail to develop 
their capacity to perform these operations, knowing that private agents will per-
form them instead. When private agents are able to perform SAR effectively, this 
concern is minimal. But if private agents are no longer able to conduct these oper-
ations successfully owing to a lack of capacity, a decrease in donations or grow-
ing security risks, the worry may increase. States and international organizations 
could then fail to respond timely to any drop in private rescue capabilities with a 
subsequent development of their own SAR capacity. As recognized by both NGOs 
and Italian Coast Guard spokespersons, SAR operations in the Central Mediterra-
nean have become structurally dependent on the contributions of NGOs. Although 
Frontex, the CSDP operation EUNAVFOR Med, the Italian Navy and private ship 
owners are regularly present in the area, NGOs’ vessels are the only ones that are 
exclusively dedicated to SAR, which makes their contribution ‘invaluable’.28 On 
several occasions between 2016 and 2017, the temporary unavailability of some 
NGOs’ vessels created a gap in existing SAR capabilities.29
A further, related worry is that the private provision of SAR could legitimize 
inaction by states. States can point to the fact that private agents are effectively 
providing SAR to justify not providing it themselves. In the longer term, this could 
28 Author’s interview with Italian Coast Guard Captain, April 2015. A similar position has also been 
stated officially by the Italian Coast Guard in a testimony to Parliament (see Senato della Repubblica 
2017).
29 Author’s interview with MSF spokesperson, April 2015.
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reduce the expectation that public actors (including states) are required to perform 
large-scale maritime humanitarian operations themselves. In constructivist terms, 
the ‘compliance pull’ (Florini 1996; Franck 1990) of the moral and legal norms that 
would require states to provide SAR may be reduced. Their inaction may be viewed 
as legitimate, particularly while SAR operations are effectively carried out by pri-
vate agents. In other words, states exploit the private provision of SAR to engage 
in ‘de-responsibilization’—reducing their perceived responsibilities. Representa-
tives of several NGOs have argued that the presence of non-governmental assets at 
sea has disincentivized ships participating in the Triton and EUNAVFOR missions 
from conducting SAR operation. Available data on the number of migrants rescued 
by each organization illustrated by Figure 1 above lend support to this argument. 
Triton’s involvement in SAR operations diminished drastically in 2016, shrinking 
to 13 per cent of the total. According to Frontex Director Fabrice Leggeri, Triton’s 
involvement in SAR decreased primarily because of the growing presence of NGOs 
offshore Libya (Senato della Repubblica 2016b). Operation EUNAVFOR Med 
Sophia—which saw its role in SAR operations shrink to 8 per cent of total rescues in 
the period between 2015 and 2017—is another case in point. Indeed, interviewees 
from various NGOs acknowledge their struggle with a ‘Catch 22’ dilemma: they 
have deployed assets at sea in response to the lack of state-led SAR operations’, but 
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Figure 1. Rescues between January 2014 and November 2017
As Figure 1 shows, NGOs became the largest provider of SAR offshore Libya, rescuing 
a total of 110,000 migrants between 2014 and December 2017. In the second half of 2017, 
however, decreasing donations, along with the hostility of the Libyan Coast Guard, and 
increasing restrictions imposed on NGOs by Italian authorities (who are now investigating 
some organizations for abetting illegal immigration), have caused a substantial decrease in 
non-governmental SAR capabilities (Cusumano 2017c).
30  Author’s interview with SOS-Méditerranée spokesperson, April 2016; Sea-Watch personnel, 
April and August 2016, and MSF’s spokesperson, October 2016.
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When private provision is efficient at providing SAR, the shrinking role of 
public providers for SAR may not be a worry. However, given the potential capri-
ciousness of private provision, de-responsibilization is a potential concern. To be 
sure, this is less of a concern for certain types of SAR operations conducted by 
NGOs. The model initially developed by Sea-Watch—based on spotting migrant 
boats and providing emergency relief while waiting for a bigger boat to take 
migrants to a safe place—has been devised precisely not to allow states to abdicate 
their responsibility, shaming governments for their failure to act by, for instance, 
releasing footage showing the frequent absence of state vessels from the rescue 
scene while simultaneously saving lives. Yet, such a rescue model is insufficient 
to address the ongoing humanitarian emergency and has failed to compel states 
to act. Indeed, Sea-Watch eventually caved in to Italian authorities’ requests to 
conduct fully fledged SAR operations.31
De-responsibilization is a concern even without any decrease in the capacity of 
NGOs to provide SAR. As documented in interviews and forcefully illustrated by 
the large number of casualties off Libya between 2016 and 2017, the central issue 
is that NGOs never had the sufficient numbers and type of boats necessary for 
comprehensive, self-sufficient SAR operations like Mare Nostrum in an area such 
as the Central Mediterranean. Only navies and coast guards have the long-term 
capability to fund and carry out full-scale, long-term, efficient SAR operations in 
large maritime regions characterized by high security risks such as Libya’s contig-
uous and territorial waters. As stressed by NGOs themselves, their presence ‘will 
not stop deaths at sea … volunteer organizations cannot replace the institutions’ 
(MOAS 2016). The private provision of SAR should therefore only be temporary, 
and public provision of SAR is vital to mitigate the risk that NGOs’ maritime res-
cue missions allow states to further abdicate their inherent responsibilities.
There is a final, broader point that we wish to highlight here that is relevant 
for appraising the challenges with public actors de facto outsourcing international 
responsibilities to private actors. Many prevailing accounts focus on the prob-
lems with for-profit actors filling public responsibilities, perhaps most notably 
the literature on PMSCs (see Avant 2005; Krahmann 2010; Pattison 2014). Indeed, 
the central reasons why non-governmental SAR is problematic—further de- 
responsibilization of states and lack of sufficient capacity to ensure adequate res-
cue at sea—are paralleled by the problems of relying on for-profit actors such 
as PMSCs. Central objections to the role of PMSCs are that they can help states 
abdicate their responsibilities (e.g. to provide adequate care for those fighting 
their wars) and that they often lack the ability to perform the services for which 
they are hired (see Hedahl 2012: 188; Pattison 2014).32 To be sure, PMSCs are often 
viewed as for-profit actors who are not interested in or responsible for the moral 
implications of their actions. This criticism does not apply to NGOs providing 
SAR. However, issues relating to insufficient capacity and de-responsibilization 
might arise even if the organizations replacing states are charities acting in a mor-
ally responsible manner. Hence, the provision of public services by private actors 
shows that even the reliance on private actors whose actions are highly morally 
31 Author’s interview with Sea-Watch spokesperson, October 2017.
32 This is of course not unique to SAR: reliance on NGOs to fulfil various responsibilities in other 
sectors, such as humanitarian aid, can be problematic too, raising several tricky ethical issues (see 
Rubenstein 2015).
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praiseworthy—such as many of the NGOs providing SAR—can be significantly 
problematic.
Conclusion
The upshot of our analysis is that the Minimal View of states’ responsibilities to 
organize SAR is not being met. NGOs simply do not have the capacity to con-
duct large-scale maritime rescue operations offshore Libya and states’ reliance on 
them can in fact make things worse. The Maximal View of states’ responsibilities, 
whereby states are required to provide SAR, is appropriate. Unlike in other realms, 
where private actors might be able to sufficiently cope with the situation, this is 
not the case in the Mediterranean. To that extent, our defence of the Maximal View 
is contingent, rather than necessary. But this does not make it any less pressing 
that states provide adequate SAR themselves. Thousands of migrants’ lives ulti-
mately depend on it. Together with the failure to fulfil remedial responsibilities to 
ensure SAR takes place outlined in the first section of the article, there is a double 
abdication of responsibilities by states: both to ensure adequate SAR and to pro-
vide it themselves.
European states refused to fund the Mare Nostrum operation and seem 
unlikely to collaborate on a similar alternative in the future or revise existing EU 
border and migration policies to lessen the likelihood SAR operations are neces-
sary. Although EU nations have launched multinational military operations such 
as Triton and EUNAVFOR MED, these missions do not primarily focus on SAR. 
Despite the transformation of Frontex into a European Border and Coast Guard, it 
is unlikely that this agency will become a large-scale provider of SAR owing to the 
limited resources and assets allocated to the agency. Additionally, Frontex focuses 
on border control rather than migrant rescue, and the division of responsibilities 
between the EU and its member states is unclear (Carrera et al. 2017). Similarly, 
although the establishment of a functioning Libyan MRCC and Coast Guard would 
contribute to filling the current gap in SAR operations off the coast of Libya, ongo-
ing EU maritime capacity-building efforts are problematic for various reasons. At 
the time of writing, Libyan forces seem focused primarily on migrant interdiction 
rather than rescue, have repeatedly hindered NGO SAR operations and have used 
violence against migrants (Heller and Pezzani 2018; Reuters 2017).33 Furthermore, 
the rescue capabilities of the Libyan Coast Guard are likely to be compromised by 
the extreme fragility of Libyan state institutions, widespread corruption and the 
importance of smuggling to the economy of Western Libya (Carrera et al. 2017). 
Thus, considering the present trajectory of European migration and border control 
policies, it seems likely that states will continue to fail in upholding their responsi-
bility to ensure and provide SAR in the Mediterranean. In spite of the limitations 
of non-governmental SAR, SOS-Méditerranée, Sea-Watch, Proactiva and other 
NGOs will need to continue to provide their sticking plaster.
33 Given the widespread evidence of torture and inhuman treatment in Libyan migrant detention 
centres, returning asylum seekers and migrants to Libya appears problematic on both moral and legal 
grounds (Amnesty International 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016; Reuters 2017).
72  Eugenio Cusumano and James Pattison
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Eugenio Cusumano is a lecturer in International Relations and European Union 
studies at the University of Leiden, the Netherlands. His research concentrates 
on the study of military organisations and non-state actors’ involvement in  crisis 
management both on land and at sea, with a focus on the activities of private 
military and security companies (PMSCs) and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs). His work has been published in leading international relations and 
 security studies journal such as the Journal of Strategic Studies, Armed Forces & 
 Society, Cooperation & Conflict International Relations, and Mediterranean Politics, and 
frequently cited in international media.
James Pattison is Professor of Politics at the University of Manchester. He is the 
 author of three books, including Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene? (Oxford University Press, 2010), which was awarded 
a Notable Book Award in 2011 by the International Studies Association (Interna-
tional Ethics Section), and The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of  Private Mili-
tary and Security Companies (Oxford University Press, 2014). His most recent book, 
The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Nonviolence (Oxford University Press, 
2018) examines the ethics of the leading alternatives to war, including economic 
sanctions, diplomacy, nonviolence, positive incentives, and accepting refugees. He 
also co-edits a book series for Routledge on War, Conflict, and Ethics and has pub-
lished various articles on the ethics of force, including in the British Journal of Polit-
ical Science, European Journal of International Relations, International Theory, Journal of 
Political Philosophy, and Review of International Studies.
References
Aalberts, T and T Gammeltoft-Hansen (2014) ‘Sovereignty at sea: the law and politics of 
saving lives in mare liberum’, Journal of International Relations and Development, 17:4, 
439–468
Aarstad, ÅK (2015) ‘The duty to assist and its disincentives: The shipping industry and the 
mediterranean migration crisis’, Mediterranean Politics, 20:3, 413–419
Amnesty International (2016) ‘EU risks fuelling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants 
in Libya’, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eu-risks-fuelling-
horrific-abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya/>
Avant, D (2005) The market for force: consequences of privatizing security (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press)
Basaran, T (2015) ‘The saved and the drowned: Governing indifference in the name of 
security’, Security Dialogue, 46:3, 205–220
BBC (2013) ‘Bristow group to take over UK search and rescue from RAF’, BBC News, 26 
March 2013
Beitz, C (1999) Political theory and international relations (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press)
Bellamy, AJ (2015) The responsibility to protect: a defense (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Campbell, Z (2017) ‘Abandoned at sea. Europe keeps Its rescue ships far from the Coast 
of Libya–where thousands of refugees have drowned’, The Intercept, 1 April. <https://
The non-governmental provision of search and rescue 73
theintercept.com/2017/04/01/europe-keeps-its-rescue-ships-far-from-the-coast-of-
libya-where-thousands-of-refugees-have-drowned/>
Caney, S (2005a) Justice beyond borders: a global political theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press)
Caney, S (2005b) ‘‘Cosmopolitan justice’, Responsibility and Climate Change’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 18:4, 747–775
Caney, S (2014) ‘Two kinds of climate justice: avoiding harm and sharing burdens’, Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 22:2, 125–149
Carrera, S and L Den Hartog (2015) Whose Mare? Rule of law challenges in the field of European 
border surveillance in the Mediterranean (Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies)
Carrera, S, S Blockmans, JP Cassarino, D Gros, and E Guild (2017) ‘The European border 
and coast guard addressing migration and asylum challenges in the Mediterranean?’ 
Center for European Policy Studies Task Force Report
Crawley, H, F Düvell, K Jones, S McMahon and N Sigona (2016) ‘Destination Europe? 
Understanding the dynamics and drivers of mediterranean migration in 2015’, MedMig 
Project Final Report
Cusumano, E (2017a) ‘Emptying the sea with a spoon? Non-Governmental providers of 
migrants search and rescue in the Mediterranean’, Marine Policy, 75, 91–98
Cusumano, E (2017b) ‘The Sea as humanitarian space. Nongovernmental search and rescue 
Dilemmas on the Central Mediterranean Migratory Route’, Mediterranean Politics, 1–8
Cusumano, E (2017c) ‘Straightjacketing migrant rescuers? The code of conduct on maritime 
NGOs’, Mediterranean Politics, 1–8
Cusumano, E (2018) ‘Migrant rescuing as organized hypocrisy: EU maritime missions 
offshore Libya between humanitarianism and border control’, Cooperation & Conflict, 
1–22
Cuttitta, P (2016) ‘Migrant deaths: data, trends, and possible causes’, Allegra Laboratory, 
April 27, <http://allegralaboratory.net/migrant-deaths-data-trends-and-possible-
causes/>
Daniels, N (2016) ‘Reflective equilibrium’, Revised Version, in E. Zalta (ed) Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium>
DeWalt, K and B DeWalt (2002) Participant observation (Walnut Creek (Altamira: Calif)
European External Action Service (EEAS) (2017) ‘EUNAVFOR Med—Operation Sophia 
factsheet’, 25 April, <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/april_2017_-_factsheet_
on_eunavfor_med_mission_english.pdf>
Florini, A (1996) ‘The evolution of international norms’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:3, 
364–389
Franck, T (1990) The power of legitimacy among nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Franzke, S (2015) ‘Not adding up: the failed promise of Europe’s Dublin System’, Migration 
Policy Institute 
Frontex (2017). ‘Risk analysis for 2017’, <http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/
Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf>
Gerver, M (2015). ‘Why the EU should consider decriminalising people smuggling’, LSE 
European Politics and Policy Blog
Glynn, I (2016) Asylum policy, boat people and political discourse (Basingstoke: Palgrave)
Grahl-Madsen, A (1986) ‘Sanctuary: legal aspects’, In Defense of the Alien, 9, 189–199
Hagen-Zanker, J and R Mallett (2016) ‘Journeys to Europe. The role of policy in migrant 
decision-making’ Overseas Development Institute Insights, <https://www.odi.org/sites/
odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10297.pdf>
Hedahl, M (2012) ‘Unaccountable: The current state of private military and security 
companies’, Criminal Justice Ethics, 31:3, 175–192
Heijer, M, J Rijpma and T Spijkerboer (2016) ‘Coercion, prohibition, and great expectations: 
The continuing failure of the common European asylum system’, Common Market Law 
Review, 53:3, 607–642
Heller, C and L Pezzani (2018) ‘The Iuventa case’, Forensic Architecture Agency, <https://
blamingtherescuers.org/iuventa/>
Heller, C and L Pezzani (2017) ‘Blaming the rescuers’, Forensic Architecture Agency, <https://
blamingtherescuers.org/>
74  Eugenio Cusumano and James Pattison
Heller, C, L Pezzani, et al. (2016) ‘Death by rescue’, Forensic Architecture Agency. <https://
deathbyrescue.org/report/narrative/>
Hernández-Carretero, M and J Carling (2012) ‘Beyond “Kamikaze Migrants”: risk taking in 
West African boat migration to Europe’, Human Organization, 71:4, 407–416
Hidalgo, S (2016) ‘The ethics of people smuggling’, Journal of Global Ethics, 12:3, 311–326
House of Lords (2016) ‘Operation Sophia, the EU’s naval mission in the Mediterranean: 
an impossible challenge’, 4th Report of Session 2015–2016, <https://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/144/144.pdf>
Human Rights Watch (2016) ‘EU/NATO: Europe’s plan endangers foreigners in Libya 
migrants, Asylum seekers face killings, torture, and rape’, <https://www.hrw.org/
print/291538>
Huysmans, J (2000) ‘The European union and the securitization of migration’, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 38:5, 751–777
International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2017) ‘Missing migrants project. 
Mediterranean update’, <https://missingmigrants.iom.int/>, accessed 24 May 2017
Kingsley, P (2017) ‘Flow of migrants to Italy slows, but nobody knows why’, The New York 
Times, 18 August
Krahmann, E (2010) States, citizens and the privatisation of security (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press)
Last, T, G Mirto, I Ulusoy, et al. (2017) ‘Deaths at the borders database: evidence of deceased 
migrants’ bodies found along the southern external borders of the European Union’, 
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 43:5, 693–712
Mabee, B (2009) ‘Pirates, privateers and the political economy of private violence’, Global 
Change, Peace & Security, 21:2, 139–152
Mainwaring, C and N Bridgen (2016) ‘Beyond the border: clandestine Migration journeys’, 
Geopolitics, 21, 243–262
Mann, I (2016) Humanity at sea: maritime migration and the foundations of international law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Marcus, G (1995) ‘Ethnography in/of the World System: the emergence of multi-sited 
Ethnography’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24:1, 95–117
Miller, D (2001) ‘Distributing responsibilities’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 9:4, 453–471
Miller, D (2007) National responsibility and global justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
MOAS (2016) ‘MOAS launch 2016 Mediterranean Mission with Two Ships, Two Drones 
Patrolling the Dead Zone, 31 May’, <https://www.moas.eu/moas-launch-2016-
mediterranean-mission-two-ships-two-drones-patrolling-dead-zone/>
Moreno-Lax, V (2017) Accessing asylum in Europe: extraterritorial border controls and refugee 
rights under EU Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Nagel, T (2005) ‘The problem of global justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 33:2, 113–147
Owens, P (2008) ‘Distinctions, distinctions: “Public” and “Private” force?’, International 
Affairs, 84:5, 977–990
Page, E (2008) ‘Distributing the burdens of climate change’, Environmental Politics, 17:4, 
556–575
Patalano, A (2015) ‘Nightmare Nostrum? Not Quite’, RUSI Journal, 160:3, 14–19
Pattison, J (2014) The morality of private war: the challenge of private military and security 
companies (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Pattison, J (2015) ‘Mapping the responsibilities to protect: a typology of international 
duties’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 7:2, 190–210
Pogge, T (1992) ‘An institutional approach to humanitarian intervention’, Public Affairs 
Quarterly, 6:1, 89–103
Pogge, T (2008) World poverty and human rights, 2nd ed (Cambridge: Polity Press)
Quinn, W (1989) ‘Actions, intentions, and consequences: the doctrine of doing and 
allowing’, Philosophical Review, 98:3, 287–312
Rabinow, P and WM Sullivan (1987) Interpretive social science: a second look (Berkeley: 
University of California Press)
Rawls, J (1999) A theory of justice, Revised ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
Repubblica (2017) ‘Migranti, Di Maio: “Ipocrita chi difende le ONG”. Replica Saviano: “Cerca 
voti di chi li vuole morti”’, 23 April, <http://www.repubblica.it/politica/2017/04/23/
news/di_maio_saviano_ong-163704617/>
The non-governmental provision of search and rescue 75
Reuters (2017) ‘ICC prosecutor mulls inquiry on crimes against migrants in Libya’, <http://
in.reuters.com/article/libya-migrants-icct/icc-prosecutor-mulls-inquiry-on-crimes-
against-migrants-in-libya-idINKBN1842F5>
Riddelvolt, M and RL Bosilca (2017) ‘Not so humanitarian after all? Assessing EU naval 
mission Sophia’, Arena Working Paper 5/17
Rubenstein, JC (2015) Between samaritans and states: the political ethics of humanitarian INGOS 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
Sangiovanni, A (2007) ‘Global justice, reciprocity, and the state’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 
35:1, 3–39
Scheffler, S (2004) ‘Doing and Allowing’, Ethics, 114:2, 215–239
Senato della Repubblica Italiana (2017a) Documento Conclusivo Sull’Indagine Conoscitiva 
Sul Contributo dei Militari Italiani al Controllo dei Flussi Migratori nel Mediterraneo e 
sull’Impatto delle Attivita’ delle Organizzazioni non Governative (Rome: 11 May), <https://
www.senato.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/dossier/file_
internets/000/002/115/Documento_conclusivo_bozza_.pdf>
Senato della Repubblica Italiana (2017b). Contributo dei militari italiani al controllo dei flussi 
migratori nel Mediterraneo. Audizione in videoconferenza del Direttore esecutivo di FRONTEX, 
Fabrice Leggeri (Rome: 12 April), <http://webtv.senato.it/webtv_comm?video_
evento=3545>
Singer, P (1972) ‘Famine, affluence, and morality’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 1:3, 229–243
Tan, KC (2006) ‘The duty to protect’ in Terry Nardin and Melissa S Williams (eds) NOMOS 
XLVII: Humanitarian Intervention (New York, NY: New York University Press), 84–116
Tan, KC (2015) ‘Humanitarian intervention as a duty’, Global Responsibility to Protect, 7:2, 
121–141
Tazzioli, M (2016) ‘Border displacements. Challenging the politics of rescue between Mare 
Nostrum and Triton’, Migration Studies, 4:1, 1–19
Thacher, D (2006) ‘The normative case study’, American Journal of Sociology, 111:6, 1631–1676
Trauner, F (2016) ‘Asylum policy: the EU’s ‘crises’ and the looming policy regime failure’, 
Journal of European Integration, 38:3, 311–325
Toaldo, M (2015) ‘Libya’s Migrant smuggling highway: lessons for Europe’, European 
Council for Foreign Relations
Trevisanut, S (2010) ‘Search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean: factor of 
cooperation or conflict?’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 25:4, 523–542
Trevisanut, S (2013) ‘Law of the sea symposium: search and rescue operations at sea—
who is in charge? Who is responsible?’, Opinio Juris, 28 May 2013, <http://opiniojuris.
org/2013/05/28/law-of-the-sea-symposium-search-and-rescue-operations-at-sea-
who-is-in-charge-who-is-responsible/>
United Nations General Assembly (2016) ‘Summit for refugees and migrants’, 19 September. 
<http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit>
United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) (2017) ‘Operational portal. Mediterranean 
situation’, <http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean>, accessed 24 May 
2017
Viviano, F and A Ziniti (2017) ‘L'inchiesta: “Iuventa voleva tagliare fuori la Guardia costiera 
italiana” Il giallo della chat con gli scafisti’, Repubblica, 4 August
Walzer, M (2002) ‘Arguing for humanitarian intervention’ in Nicolaus Mills and Kira 
Brunner (eds) The new killing fields: Massacre and the politics of intervention (New York, 
NY: BasicBooks), 19–35
Weintraub, J (1997) ‘The theory and politics of the public/private distinction’ in Jeff 
Weintraub and Krisham Kumar (eds) Public and private in thought and practice: perspectives 
on the grand dichotomy (London: University of Chicago Press), 1–42
